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hypotheses1 
 
Mark Levels, Rolf van der Velden and Jim Allen 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we empirically explore how the often reported relationship between 
overeducation and wages can best be understood. Exploiting the newly published Programme 
for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) data (OECD 2013), we are able 
to achieve a better estimation of the classical ORU-model (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981), by 
controlling for heterogeneity of observable skills. Our findings suggest that 1) a considerable 
part of the effect of educational mismatches can be attributed to skills heterogeneity, and 2) 
that the extent to which skills explain educational mismatches varies by institutional contexts. 
These observations suggest that skills matter for explaining wage effects of education and 
educational mismatches, but the extent to which this is the case also depends on institutional 
contexts.  
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we empirically explore how the often reported relationship between 
overeducation and wages can best be understood. Exploiting the newly published data from 
the Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies PIAAC (OECD 2013), 
we are able to achieve a better estimation of the classical ORU-model (Duncan and Hoffman, 
1981), by controlling for heterogeneity of observable skills. Our findings suggest that a 
considerable part of the effect of educational mismatches can be attributed to skills 
heterogeneity. Our observations further suggest that the extent to which skills explain wage 
effects of education and educational mismatches also depends on institutional contexts.  
The incidence and wage effects of overeducation have been well-established by 
empirical studies (cf. Green, McIntosh and Vignoles, 1999; Groot and Maassen van den 
Brink, 2000; Hartog, 2000; Sloane, 2003; Quintini, 2011). Empirical analyses consistently 
show that (1) people who work in jobs for which they are overqualified earn less than workers 
who have the same level of education, but who work in jobs that require that level of 
education, and that (2) overeducated people earn more than people who work in equivalent 
jobs but have attained the level of schooling required for that job (Sicherman, 1991; Hersch, 
1991; Garcia-Serrano and Malo-Ocana, 1996; Dekker, de Grip and Heijke, 2002; Sloane, 
2003). Many papers have aimed to explain these stylized facts (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; 
Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988; Sloane et al. 1999; and McGuinness, 2006). Much of the 
debate has focussed on the question of whether the match between a worker’s education and 
that required for his/her job has a distinct effect on productivity, in addition to the effect of 
education itself. Many authors have proposed theoretical reasons for believing that this may 
be the case, for example citing job assignment theory (Hartog, 1977; Sattinger, 1993; 2012). 
This theory proposes that, even if we accept that the skills obtained in education contribute 
positively to productivity in general, the extent to which workers can use those skills may 
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depend to some extent on productivity limits imposed by job characteristics. For overeducated 
workers, job constraints may allow only a limited use of their skills, which in turn limits their 
productivity and consequently their wages. This would suggest that overeducated workers 
underutilise their skills and vice versa undereducated workers overutilise their skills.  
However, research shows that educational mismatches and skill mismatches correlate 
only weakly (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Quintini, 2011). 
Two explanations have been forward to explain the observed effects of educational 
mismatches and the weak relation with skills mismatches.  
Heterogeneous skills theory (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 
2007) points out that considerable variation in skills exists within educational levels. If we 
accept that this is the case, it is likely that relatively high-skilled workers will tend to be 
sorted into more complex jobs that match their skills better than jobs that formally require 
their own level of education, while low-skilled workers will be sorted into less complex jobs 
that also provide a better match to their actual skill levels. According to this view, what has 
been labelled undereducation and overeducation may – in some cases at least – be only an 
adjustment by the market that shifts workers to jobs that in fact better match their capabilities 
than would jobs that formally require their own level of education. According to this view, it 
is the skills possessed by these workers, rather than the mismatch they nominally experience, 
that is driving the observed wage effects.  
Allen and Van der Velden (2001) propose an alternative explanation for the wage 
effects of over- and undereducation and their weak relation to skills mismatches, namely that 
it is the result of institutional regulation of the labour market. In most countries there are 
labour laws and institutions designed to protect the rights of workers in the labour market. In 
part at least, these laws and institutions have arisen in response to uncertainty as to what 
constitutes fair treatment. Because workers’ skills and productivity can rarely be observed 
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perfectly, pay rates will need to be established through some form of bargaining. It has been 
forcefully argued by scholars such as Spence (1973) that under such conditions employers 
aim to base a given worker’s wages on perceived signals of the likely productivity of workers 
with given observable characteristics (such as specific educational qualifications) working in 
a comparable job, or performing comparable tasks. It is usually supposed that resorting to 
such signals will be a temporary measure that will quite quickly become unnecessary as 
information about the actual performance of the worker becomes available, but when labour 
laws and institutions become powerful it may be difficult to achieve this. When wage setting 
is strongly institutionalized, basing wages on proxies or signals such as the required education 
for a given job or the educational qualifications of the worker may become a permanent 
feature of wage setting processes rather than a temporary stopgap solution in lieu of better 
information. Similarly, labour laws in a country may restrict employers’ ability to adjust 
wages to match performance, or to dismiss underperforming workers. If this is true, there may 
be substantial wage effects of educational mismatches that cannot be explained by individual 
productivity differences, whether due to differences in skills or to poor matching between 
actual and required skills. If so, we would expect to observe these ‘unexplained’ wage effects 
of educational mismatches to occur much more in situations where wages are more affected 
by institutional arrangements.  
To date, the debate about which theory best explains the relationship between 
overeducation and wages has been hampered by data problems (Sloane, 2003). The most 
important problem is that there has been no large scale dataset that combines measures of both 
required education and skills. Quintini (2011) has attempted to use the International Adult 
Literacy Survey (IALS) for this purpose, but although this dataset includes good measures of 
skills, it lacks reliable data on required level of education. Other datasets simply lack good 
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measures of skills, or are not large enough to cover institutional variation across different 
countries.  
The recently conducted international large-scale assessment PIAAC provides reliable 
measurements of all the elements we need, i.e. wage, years of acquired and required 
schooling, as well as direct measures of key information processing skills. As such, these data 
allow us to better distinguish between the various theoretical explanations for the relationship 
between educational (mis)matches and wages than any previous data set. Although the 
measured skills are not the perfect measure of all relevant abilities, and much skills 
heterogeneity will plausibly remain unobserved, these data can be used to establish whether 
the relationships between wages and overeducation, undereducation and required education 
can partly be attributed to skills heterogeneity. Furthermore, the cross-national character of 
the data allows for exploring the role of labour market institutions.  
In the next section, we formally deduce hypotheses from the abovementioned theories. 
More specifically, we seek to answer the following research questions:  
1) To what extent are required education, overeducation and undereducation related to 
individual wages?  
2) To what extent can the effects of required education, overeducation, and undereducation 
on individual wages be explained by individual differences in skills?  
3) To what extent is there cross-national variation in the extent to which the relationship 
between wages on the one hand, and required education, overeducation, and 
undereducation on the other hand can be explained by skills heterogeneity? 
4) To what extent is this cross-national variation related to differences in labour market 
institutions?  
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2. Theory and hypotheses 
In a significant expansion of the classic Mincerian wage function (Mincer, 1974), Duncan and 
Hoffman (1981) proposed a model that allows for distinguishing between individuals’ 
attained level of education and the level of education required in their job. In this so-called 
ORU-model, it is possible to estimate the effects of overeducation O, required education R 
and undereducation U on wages. The ORU model stipulates a relationship between wages on 
the one hand, and overeducation, required education and undereducation, on the other hand. 
In a cross-national setting, the model specifications are of the general form: 
 
lnWi = δoEoi + δrEri + δuEui + c’iα + x’iβ + εi      [1] 
 
in which Wi is the observed wage of individual i, Eoi is the number of years of overeducation, 
Eri is the number of years of required education, and Eui the number of years of 
undereducation. To account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries, we include a 
vector with country fixed effects dummies, denoted as c. Furthermore, x is a vector that 
contains control variables, such as age and work experience, and εi is an idiosyncratic error 
term.  
 Now, we allow for differentiation between education and skills. We expand Equation 
[1] with a vector of direct observations of skills, denoted as s. Now, the model reads: 
  
lnWi = δoEoi + δrEri + δuEui + c’iα + x’iβ + s’γ + εi     [2] 
 
In Equation [2], the wage returns of skills are denoted by γ. Note that we do not assume that 
an individual’s education and skills are uncorrelated. On the contrary, we expect that 
education, but also control variables like age and work experience affect skills, but that 
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conditional on these variables, skills can be quite heterogeneous. By including the skills in the 
ORU model, we will be able to see whether skills affect wages over and above their effect 
through education.  
 As described earlier, previous findings show that:  
 
δr > δo > |δu| > 0          [3] 
 
The basic idea of this paper is that the various theories that have been put forward make 
different predictions about the extent to which these parameters are driven by individual skills 
differences, and about their cross-national variability. In the remainder of this section, we will 
formally derive such hypotheses. In order to do so, we will specify two (nested) specifications 
of Equation [2], one in which skills are not controlled for, and a second specification in which 
skills are controlled for. For reasons of clarity and precision, we describe the various 
hypotheses in logical terms, and will treat the two specifications as two different conditions 
under which the same model will yield different predictions. Under the first specification, all 
skills variables are restricted to zero, so that s = 0. Note that under this specification, Equation 
[2] collapses to the standard ORU model described in Equation [1]. Under the second 
specification, we put no restrictions on the skills variables in Equation [2], so that s ≠ 0. 
Based on these specifications, we can formulate the following formal hypotheses 
based on the heterogeneous skills theory. In its strongest form, the heterogeneous skills theory 
leads to the following prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (strong):  
δr = δo = |δu| = 0   &  
γ > 0 
8 
 
 
In words: after controlling for skills, we expect no significant effect of required education, 
overeducation or undereducation on wages, while we do expect skills to have an effect. Note 
that testing this hypothesis would require that we observe all relevant skills, which is highly 
improbable, if not impossible. Under these conditions, a weaker version of this hypothesis is 
more realistic. Such hypothesis states that a significant part of these effects is explained by 
observed skills. In that case the absolute values of δr, δo and δu are significantly lower in 
Equation [2] than in Equation [1].  
 
Hypothesis 1 (weak):  
(δr | s > 0) < (δr | s = 0)  &  
(δo | s > 0) < (δo | γ = 0)  &  
(|δu| | s > 0) < (|δu| | s = 0)  &  
γ > 0 
 
To answer research questions 3 and 4, we will consider Equations [1] and [2] separately for 
each country. The country estimates of γ in Equation [2] will provide us with an estimate of 
the extent to which skills affect wages in the different countries and comparing δr, δo and δu in 
Equations [1] and [2] can indicate the extent to which skills explain the wage returns to 
overeducation, undereducation and required education in each country. So, let ζrc be the 
proportion of the wage returns to required education explained by skills in country c, ζoc be 
the proportion of the wage returns to overeducation explained by skills in country c, and ζuc be 
the proportion of the wage returns to undereducation explained by skills in country c. 
Furthermore, δrc is the effect of required education on wages in country c, δoc is the effect of 
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overeducation on wages in country c, δuc is the effect of undereducation on wages in country. 
Then, it follows that:  
 
ζrc  = ((δrc | s = 0) –  (δrc | s > 0)) / (δrc | s = 0)     [4a] 
ζoc  = ((δoc | s = 0) –  (δoc | s > 0)) / (δoc | s = 0)       [4b] 
ζuc  = ((|δuc| | s = 0) –  (|δuc| | s > 0)) / (|δuc| | s = 0)       [4c] 
 
To answer research question 4 we can then estimate the following equations   
γc =  λ0 +  λsLMPIc + εc        [5a] 
ζrc = λ0 +  λrLMPIc + εc         [5b] 
ζoc = λ0 +  λoLMPIc + εc        [5c] 
ζuc = λ0 +  λuLMPIc + εc        [5d] 
 
in which LMPIc is the index of labour market protection legislation in country c and εc is an 
idiosyncratic error term. The parameter λ0 is an intercept, λs is the relationship between labour 
market protectionism and the wage returns to skills by country, denoted by γc. Parameters λr, 
λo and λu denote the relationship between labour market protectionism and the extent to which 
wage returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation are explained by skills. 
Following the previous discussion on institutional theory, we can predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
(2a) λs < 0   & 
(2b) λo < 0   & 
(2c) λr  < 0   & 
(2d) λu < 0  
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 In words: we expect the country-specific effects of skills on wages to be negatively related to 
the country’s LMPI: in countries with stronger labour market institutions, skills have less 
effects on wages (hypothesis 2a). Moreover we expect that the country-specific proportion of 
the effects of required education, overeducation and undereducation that is explained by skills 
to be negatively related to the country’s LMPI (hypotheses 2b-d). In countries with stronger 
labour market institutions, education related wage differentials are less related to skills. 
     
3. Data and measurements 
The data we use for the analyses come from the PIAAC survey, collected by the OECD 
(2013a) in 24 highly industrialized countries. The survey is designed to provide valid and 
reliable estimates of adults’ competences in key information-processing skills, to identify 
proficiency differences between sub-groups of the population, to understand development, 
maintenance and use of skills, as well as to determine the impact of proficiency levels on life 
chances (OECD, 2013b). National samples contain over 5000 adults between the age of 16 
and 65. Respondents were interviewed using computer assisted personal interviews, although 
for the testing pencil-and-paper data collection strategies were also used. Respondents were 
given assessment tests designed to directly measure their cognitive skills on various domains. 
More specifically, these tests measured numerical and literacy skills, as well as respondents’ 
capacity to solve problems in technology-rich environments. The data also hold information 
on respondents’ non-cognitive skills, on key demographic and socio-economic background 
characteristics, as well as on skills use in the work place and at home. The survey is cross-
culturally and cross-nationally valid.  
To prepare the data for our analyses, we have made a number of selections. Details are 
to be found in the Appendix. First, we only selected males who were employed fulltime. This 
was based on the reported number of usual working hours per week. Fulltime workers are 
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defined as workers with a minimum of 36 working hours per week. To avoid outliers, we 
excluded everybody reporting more than 80 working hours per week. We excluded those who 
were self-employed, people who served in the armed forces, as well as unpaid family workers. 
To avoid outliers in the wage distribution we excluded the top and bottom one percent in each 
country. We excluded France and Russia, as these data were not yet available as well as 
Australia. The working sample consists of some 1200 cases in most countries. In Canada the 
sample existed of some 6069 cases, from which we took a random sample of 20%, resulting 
in NCanada=1190 cases to reduce possible bias due to oversampling of Canadian respondents. 
Missing values were deleted listwise. The total working sample contains N=26322 
respondents from 21 countries.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Measurements  
Below, we will discuss the measurement of the variables we use in detail. An overview of 
descriptive statistics of all the variables in our model is given in Table 1. 
Wages: as our dependent variable, we use the natural logarithm of the monthly wage, adjusted 
for purchasing power parity to account for cross-national differences. Respondents in the top 
and bottom 1% on this variable in each country are omitted from the analyses to avoid 
outliers. Monthly wages in our data set range from USD 513 to USD 213198. The mean 
wage is USD 3490. 
Educational attainment is measured in PIAAC in the nominal number of years respondents 
spent in formal education. The measure is derived from the reported highest level of 
education in national education systems, converted into nominal years of schooling by the 
PIAAC consortium and country experts (OECD, 2013b).  
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Required education: the PIAAC questionnaire contains a question asking respondents what 
education level they thought was required for their current jobs. Verbatim, this question was: 
“If applying today, what would be the usual qualifications, if any, that someone would need 
to GET this type of job?”. Based on the answers respondents gave to this question and 
information about national education systems, this was converted into cross-nationally 
comparable measure of nominal years of formal education needed to get the job (OECD, 
2013b). The measure ranges from 0 to 22 years, with a mean of 12.9  years.  
Overeducation: our measure is derived from the measures of respondents’ educational 
attainment and the education level required for their job. We use the operational definition 
of overeducation common in this line of literature, and define overeducation as the extent to 
which individuals have attained an educational level that is higher than is required for the 
job they have. More formally, let overeducation be EO, required education in years of 
schooling be ER, and respondents’ educational attainment in years of schooling be EA. Also, 
let EO ≥ 0. Then, we can define the extent of overeducation as:  
  
 EO = EA – ER  if  EA > ER    and  
 EO = 0   if  EA ≤ ER         
 
Undereducation: Our measure of undereducation follows a similar reasoning. Undereducation 
is defined as the extent to which individuals have attained an educational level that is lower 
than is actually required for the job they have. More formally, let undereducation be EU, and 
restrict EU ≥ 0. Then, we can define the extent of undereducation as:  
  
 EU = ER – EA  if  ER > EA   and  
 EU = 0   if  ER ≤ EA         
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Skills: PIAAC contains measures of three types of skills, i.e. literacy skills, numeracy skills, 
and skills related to problem solving in technology-rich environments (OECD, 2013b). All 
three skills measures are constructed using adaptive testing and plausible values are 
calculated using Item Response Theory (IRT). The tests on problem solving in technology 
rich environments were only presented to people who reported that they had at least some 
computer experience, were willing to take the computer-based assessment and had at least 
minimum levels of computer abilities. Including these tests would non-randomly reduce our 
sample size with almost 33%. We therefore restrict ourselves to the measurements of 
numeracy and literacy to operationalise skills. As the skill proficiencies of literacy and 
numeracy are highly correlated  (r = 0.905) we only use numeracy for the main analysis and 
literacy for the robustness check. The OECD (2013b) defines numeracy as “the ability to 
access, use, interpret and communicate mathematical information and ideas in order to 
engage in and manage the mathematical demands of a range of situations in adult life.” The 
tests of numeracy measure how well respondents are able to use mathematical information 
to solve problems that might actually occur in real life. Numeracy is measured with 10 
plausible values.We use the first of the reported plausible values as an indication of the 
numeracy skills of individuals.  
Age: we control for life-cycle variation in wages by including respondents’ age in years. We 
also include a quadratic term, to account for the non-linearity of the relationship between 
age and wages. 
Work experience: we also control for the effects work experience has on wages, by including 
the total numbers of years respondents reported to have had paid work during their lifetime. 
Here too, we include a quadratic term. 
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Working hours: Although we select people working fulltime (defined as 36 hours or more), 
there is still considerable variation in number of working hours. Therefore we control for the 
number of hours individuals work per week in their current job. As indicated above, we 
excluded respondents reporting to work more than 80 hours per week to avoid outliers. The 
mean number of hours worked is 43,89.  
Immigration status: we use dummies to distinguish first generation immigrants (both parents 
and respondent were foreign born), 1.5 generation immigrants (respondent and one parent 
foreign born, one parent born in test country), second generation immigrants (both parents 
foreign born, respondent born in test country), 2.5 generation immigrant (respondent and 
one parent born in test country, one parent foreign born), and remigrants (i.e. respondent 
foreign born, both parents non-foreign born). People without an observed history of 
migration are the reference category. 
Country fixed effects: we control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries by 
including country dummies. Austria is the reference category. 
Labour Market Protection Index (LMPI): As a measurement of the flexibility of labour 
markets, we use the Labour Market Protection Index, calculated by the OECD (2009) in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries in 2008. This index is designed to measure cross-
national differences in the extent to which workers in various countries are protected by 
employment protection legislation. It has a country-level mean of 2.10, and ranges from 0.85 
(USA) to Spain (3.11). A higher score means a higher level of employment protection. 
 
[Figure 1] 
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4 Analyses and results 
Before we start with the actual analyses, Figure 1 shows the relation between educational 
mismatches and skills mismatches. In this figure, skills mismatches are proxied by the 
answers to the following two questions in the PIAAC questionnaire: “Do you feel that you 
have the skills to cope with more demanding duties than those you are required to perform in 
your current job?” and “Do you feel that you need further training in order to cope well with 
your present duties?”. The answer “yes” to the first question is commonly taken as an 
indication of underutilisation of skills and the answer “yes” to the second question is 
commonly taken as an indication of overutilisation of skills (OECD, 2011). Note that the two 
questions are not mutually exclusive and respondents can and do report positive answers to 
both.  
 Figure 1 shows that a large proportion of workers report to have some underutilisation 
of skills: on average 84%. Although the proportions slightly higher for overeducated workers 
and lower for undereducated workers , the relation is in fact quite weak, as has been reported 
before (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Quintini, 2011). The 
same applies for the indicator of overutilization. On average some 35% report that additional 
training would be needed to better perform their current duties. This proportion is as expected 
somewhat higher for undereducated workers and lower for overeducated workers, but the 
differences are small.  
 Arguably these questions are only weak indicators of possible skill mismatches, due to 
their subjective nature. That is the very reason why we resorted to using objective test scores 
in the first place. In Table 2 we present the analyses using test scores as proxies for worker’s 
skills. 
  
[Table 2 here] 
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In Model 1 we follow the classical Duncan and Hoffman (1981) ORU model, stipulating a 
relationship between overeducation, required education and undereducation and wages. The 
specifications estimated here are of the general form described in Equation [1]. In Model 2 we 
estimate an extended version of this model by including the numeracy skills. This model 
follows Equation [2].  
The results of Model 1 are in line with previous findings. First, the relationship 
between required years of schooling and wages is positive. The strength of the relationship 
(δr=0,080) indicates that each additional year of required schooling, yields a wage premium of 
some 8%. The effect of overeducation is less than half  that size, with an estimate of 
(δo=0.033). Having more education than is required for the job pays off but not as much as the 
years of required education for that job. Each additional year of education yields a wage 
premium of some 3%. Undereducation is negatively related to wages (δu=-0.021) The 
absolute effect size is as expected smaller than the effect size of overeducation. Each year of 
undereducation yields a wage penalty of some 2%.  
In Model 2, the proficiency score on numeracy skills is added to the model. Numeracy 
skills (γ = 0.144) are positively related to wages. If we compare the standardized effects, the 
effect size (standardised parameter = 0.124) is around one third of the effect of required 
education ((standardised parameter = 0.361). Compared to Model 1, the relationship between 
required education and wages is reduced with 16% to δr=0.067. We can also see that the 
effect of overschooling is reduced with 28% to δo =0.024. Differences in numeracy skills 
account for 38% of the effect of underschooling as observed in Model 1.  
 How do these findings bear on the hypotheses we formulated? The strong version of 
the heterogeneous skills theory predicted that, after controlling for skills, there would be no 
residual effect of required education, overeducation and undereducation on wages. That is 
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clearly not the case. However, the results do clearly show that a significant part of all three 
effects can be explained by skills, suggesting that the weaker version of the heterogeneous 
skills theory is supported by the data. There are however three additional remarks that are 
highly relevant here.  
Firstly, it must be noted that we do not observe all skills that are relevant in theory, 
and that by design, we cannot exclude the possibility that the relationship between 
overeducation and skills would be further reduced if we would be able to control for the now 
unobserved skills. In other words, our test of the heterogeneous skills theory is a highly 
conservative one. 
Secondly, the expectation that it would be possible to explain all the wage variance 
that is related to required education, overeducation and undereducation presupposes that 
employers are perfectly informed about all the relevant skills and other productive attributes 
of workers. We deem this unrealistic. In practice, it is very plausible that there is at least some 
uncertainty, and as a consequence there will be some tendency to assign wages based on 
observable features of workers and jobs rather than entirely on actual productive skills. 
Consequently, even if we possessed the perfect knowledge that most employers lack, in the 
form of a precise measurement of all relevant skills, the strong version of the heterogeneous 
skills theory is unlikely to be fully confirmed. There will be some residual effect indicating 
that people are rewarded partly based on easily observable features such as education and job 
titles. 
This leads directly on to the third point, which is that we would expect the size of this 
residual effect to depend to a large extent on the particular institutional arrangements that 
prevail in a country. In countries in which wage setting is largely a matter that is decided 
between employer and employee, with little regard needing to be paid to laws and institutions 
designed to protect workers’ rights, we would expect the residual effect to be quite small and 
18 
 
largely transient. However, in countries in which protectionist labour market laws and 
institutions play an important role, we would expect the residual effect to be far larger and 
more permanent. This is precisely the point of our second hypothesis, and it is to this that we 
now turn.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Based on institutional theory, we posited the hypothesis that the extent to which individual 
skills affect wages over and above the effects of required education, overeducation and 
undereducation is larger in countries in which employment protection is lower. Moreover we 
hypothesized that the extent to which skills can explain the relationship between required 
education, overeducation and undereducation on the one hand and wages on the other hand is 
larger in countries in which employment protection is lower. To test these hypotheses, we 
examined cross-national variation in the effects of skills on wages and on the proportion of 
the wage effects of required education, overeducation and undereducation that can be 
attributed to skills. To establish this proportion for each country, we ran the model specified 
in Equation [2] separately for each country.  
In the first column of Table 3, we present the wage effects of skills in each country 
according to Equation [2]. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the full models. There is indeed 
considerable cross-national variation in the effect of numeracy skills on wages, ranging from 
a low 0.052 in Czech Republic to a high 0.237 in the United Kingdom.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
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Figure 2 presents the country-level relationship between labour market protection and the 
wage returns to numeracy skills. On the x-axis of the graph, we have ordered countries 
according to the extent to which employees enjoy legal labour market protection. The OECD 
index combines information about laws that protect workers against firing, but also about the 
extent to which labour unions can participate in collective bargaining processes, and is thus a 
very broad and general measure. On the y-axis the countries are ordered based on the effect of 
numeracy skills on wages. The figure shows that the wage returns to skills are indeed lower in 
countries with a stronger labour market protection.  
Columns 2-4 of Table 3 present information about country differences in the extent to 
which skills explain the correlation between wages and required years of schooling, 
overeducation and undereducation. The table shows that again large cross-national variation 
exists. In the US (23%), Germany (22%), Estonia (24%), the UK (21%), Japan (21%), and 
Canada (21%), skills are important explanations for the returns to required education. In 
contrast, in Cyprus (4%), Czech Republic (6%) and Slovak Republic (5%), skills contribute 
much less to the explanation of the relation between required education and wages. In the US 
(60%), Japan (66%), and Estonia (58%), skills explain (nearly) all of the returns to 
overeducation, whereas in Cyprus, Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic barely any of this 
effect is explained by skills. In Estonia and the Slovak Republic the undereducation effect is 
fully explained by skills and also in Denmark (93%), Japan (51%) and the United Kingdom 
(42%) the proportion of the wage effect of undereducation that is explained by skills is very 
high. On the other hand the proportion of the wage effect of undereducation that is explained 
by skills is very low in Finland (9%), Cyprus (11%), Czech Republic (14%), Korea (14%) and 
Spain (9%).  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
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Figure 3 shows how labour market protection in countries is related to the extent to which 
wage effects of required education, overeducation and undereducation are explained by skills. 
On the x-axis of the graph, we have ordered countries according to the extent to which 
employees enjoy legal labour market protection. On the y-axis the countries are ordered based 
on the extent to which the relationship between required education (top panel), overschooling 
(middle panel) and underschooling (bottom panel) can be explained by individuals’ skills.  
 In the top panel of Figure 3 we can see that the extent to which the wage effects of 
required education are explained by skills is somewhat stronger in the low LMPI countries 
than in the strong LMPI countries. The middle panel of Figure 3 shows a somewhat stronger 
negative relationship between employment protection and the extent to which skills can 
explain the relationship between overeducation and wages, which is in line with the 
institutional hypothesis. It indicates that in strong LMPI countries the wage effects of 
overeducation are less driven by skills than in low LMPI countries. Furthermore, the overall 
proportions that are explained in each country are higher and the relation is somewhat 
stronger than is the case for required education.  
  The lower panel of Figure 3 shows that there is no relation between LMPI and the 
extent to which the wage effect of undereducation is explained by skills. Nonetheless, we note 
that a large part of the effect of undereducation is related to skills, and this holds for many 
countries. This reflects the situation that undereducation only occurs when people have the 
skills to master the job in question, which again supports the heterogeneous skills theory.  
 Figure 3 suggests two things. First, the effects of overeducation are more strongly 
related to skills than is the case for required schooling, for both low and high LMPI countries. 
Second, even in strong LMPI countries some of the wage effects of required education are 
explained by underlying differences in skill levels. Taking into account that this is a 
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conservative estimate of the effect of skills, the real explanatory effect of skills in these 
countries might be much higher. This could reflect the fact that in collective bargaining one of 
the arguments for assigning higher wages to higher educational levels is because of the 
presumed higher skills levels. 
 
5 Conclusions and discussion  
In this paper, we have aimed to shed further light on explanations for the well-established 
relationship between overeducation and earnings. Using new empirical data (PIAAC, OECD, 
2013), we were able to estimate the classical ORU-model while controlling for heterogeneity 
of observable skills. This allowed us to address four research questions.  
 First, we asked to what extent required education, overeducation and undereducation 
are related to individual wages. Our findings are in line with earlier studies that show that 
overeducated workers earn less than workers who have the same level of education, but work 
in jobs that require their level of education, and overeducated workers earn more than people 
who work in equivalent jobs but have attained the level of schooling required for that job. 
 Secondly, we asked to what extent the effects of required education, overeducation, 
and undereducation on individual wages can be explained by individual differences in skills. 
Our analyses show that skills heterogeneity contributes considerably to the explanation of 
educational mismatch. The effect of numeracy skills on wages explains some one-sixth of the 
wage effect of required education, and little under one-third of the wage effects of 
overeducation and undereducation. Considering that we only use one measure of one 
observable skill, these effects are in fact quite high. One can easily imagine that much more 
could be explained if we could have measured all relevant skills. At least we can conclude 
that part of the educational mismatches is just apparent and do not necessarily imply that 
worker’s skills are heavily underutilised or overutilised. The incidence of undereducation and 
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overeducation in these cases can be interpreted as an adjustment by the market that shifts 
workers to jobs that in fact better match their capabilities than would jobs formally requiring 
their own level of education. The significance of skills is also illustrated by the fact that even 
in strong LMPI countries some of the wage effects of required education are explained by 
underlying differences in skill levels. Again taking into account that this is a conservative 
estimate of the effect of skills, the real explanatory effect of skills in these countries is likely 
to be higher. This seems to suggest that even in a situation of collective bargaining one of the 
arguments for assigning higher wages to higher educational levels is because of the presumed 
higher skills levels.  
In our third and fourth research questions, we asked to what extent there is cross-
national variation in the extent to which the relationship between wages on the one hand, and 
required education, overeducation, and undereducation on the other hand can be explained by 
skills heterogeneity, and to what extent this cross-national variation is related to differences in 
labour market institutions? We clearly observe that in all countries, a considerable part of the 
wage effects of over- and undereducation is explained by heterogeneous skills. 
Notwithstanding this clear support for the heterogeneous skills theory, we also find some 
support for the institutional theory, which predicted that the extent to which skills can explain 
the wage effects of required education, overeducation and undereducation will depend 
strongly on the institutional context. In countries with weak labour market protection, we find 
stronger direct effects of skills on wages and in these countries a larger proportion of the 
observed wage effects can be accounted for by skills. By contrast, where labour market 
protection is strong, skills have a weaker direct effect on wages and account for relatively 
little of the wage effects of required education, overeducation and undereducation. It is hard 
to find an alternative explanation for these observed effects of labour market institutions. All 
countries in question are highly developed and although there may be differences in economic 
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conditions, it is not immediately clear why numeracy skills affect wages strongly in countries 
like Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom and so low in Italy or Cyprus. It is unlikely that 
some omitted skill variable might be responsible for this. That would assume that for example 
in country X wages are strongly related to skill A and in country Y it would be strongly 
related to skill B, with little or no correlation between skill A and B. That seems quite 
unlikely, and we think that it is plausible to infer from our findings that the extents to which 
individual skills affect wages is constrained by the institutional arrangements.  
We conclude that these observations make plausible that skills do matter in explaining 
wage effects of education and educational mismatches, but that the extent to which this is the 
case also depends on institutional contexts.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Numeracy skills 80,39 420,24 284,34 47,11 
Literacy skills 78,86 415,64 281,20 42,92 
Monthly wage (US$) 512,90 213198,31 3490,01 3497,65 
Required education 0 22 12,93 3,13 
Overeducation 0 18 0,89 1,78 
Undereducation 0 14 0,51 1,27 
Age 16 65 40,64 11,72 
Work experience 0 55 19,87 12,18 
Number of working hours per week 36 80 43,89 7,53 
1st generation migrants 0 1 0,08 0,27 
1.5 generation migrants 0 1 0,01 0,09 
2nd generation migrants 0 1 0,02 0,13 
2.5 generation migrants 0 1 0,05 0,21 
Remigrants 0 1 0,01 0,09 
LMPI 0,85 3,11 2,11 0,56 
N= 26322    Source: PIAAC.  
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Figure 1. The relationship between self-reported underutilizing and overutilization of skills and 
objective overeducation and undereducation 
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Table 2. ORU model: regression required education, overeducation and undereducation on log-
earnings 
  Model 1     Model 2     
  B Beta Sig. B Beta Sig. 
Intercept 5,838  *** 5,588  *** 
       
ORU       
Required education (δr) ,080 ,432 *** ,067 ,361 *** 
Overeducation (δo) ,033 ,103 *** ,024 ,073 *** 
Undereducation (δu) -,021 -,046 *** -,013 -,028 *** 
       
Numeracy skills (γ /100) ,144 ,124 *** 
    
Controls    
Age ,027 ,544 *** ,027 ,541 *** 
Age2 -,000 -,525 *** -,000 -,504 *** 
Work experience ,017 ,362 *** ,016 ,330 *** 
Work experience2 -,000 -,226 *** -,000 -,201 *** 
Number of working hours per week ,011 ,142 *** ,011 ,141 *** 
natives (reference)       
1st generation migrants -,108 -,050 *** -,059 -,028 *** 
1.5 generation migrants -,037 -,005  -,024 -,004  
2nd generation migrants ,000 ,000  ,016 ,004  
2.5 generation migrants ,009 ,003  ,015 ,006  
Remigrants -,050 -,007  -,046 -,007  
       
Country fixed effects       
Austria (ref)    
Belgium ,069 ,025 *** ,065 ,023 *** 
Canada ,119 ,043 *** ,142 ,051 *** 
Cyprus -,174 -,052 *** -,150 -,045 *** 
Czech Republic -,694 -,239 *** -,676 -,233 *** 
Denmark ,271 ,118 *** ,269 ,117 *** 
Estonia -,496 -,196 *** -,494 -,195 *** 
Finland ,053 ,020 *** ,044 ,016 ** 
Germany ,002 ,001  ,017 ,007  
Ireland -,014 -,004  ,036 ,012 * 
Italy -,211 -,066 *** -,183 -,057 *** 
Japan -,076 -,030 *** -,080 -,031 *** 
Korea -,176 -,069 *** -,134 -,053 *** 
Netherlands ,029 ,010  ,037 ,013 * 
Norway ,211 ,083 *** ,223 ,087 *** 
Poland -,713 -,311 *** -,676 -,295 *** 
Slovak Republic -,767 -,268 *** -,751 -,262 *** 
Spain -,221 -,074 *** -,193 -,064 *** 
Sweden ,067 ,024 *** ,054 ,020 *** 
United Kingdom ,003 ,001  ,017 ,007  
United States ,128 ,040 *** ,166 ,051 *** 
Adjusted R2 0,594     0,604     
Source: PIAAC  *** p < .001 ** p <.01 * p < .05. 
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Table 3. ORU model by country:  the returns to skills, the returns to required education, 
overeducation and undereducation on ln(earnings) and the proportion of  effects explained by 
skills 
 γ 
% δra 
interpeted by γ 
% δoa 
interpeted by γ 
% δua  
interpeted by γ 
Austria 0,151 14 14 36 
Belgium 0,104 17 18 30 
Canada 0,151 21 27 29 
Cyprus 0,053 4 11 11 
Czech Republic 0,052 6 8 13 
Denmark 0,084 11 23 93 
Estonia 0,205 24 58 100$ 
Finland 0,071 9 16 9 
Germany 0,221 22 40 91 
Ireland 0,186 19 35 32 
Italy 0,105 13 32 26 
Japan 0,226 21 66 51 
Korea 0,114 11 18 14 
Netherlands 0,112 12 27 25 
Norway 0,109 16 22 22 
Poland 0,149 19 34 45 
Slovak Republic 0,061 5 7 100 
Spain 0,082 9 22 9 
Sweden 0,095 15 33 36 
United Kingdom 0,237 21 46 42 
United States 0,211 23 60 29 
Source: PIAAC  *** p < .001 ** p <.01 * p < .05.$Suppressor effect 
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Figure 2. Country-level relationship between labor market institutions and 
the effect of numeracy skills of earnings 
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Figure 3: Relationship between labor market protection in countries and the extent to which 
effects of required education, overeducation and undereducation on log-earnings in these 
countries are explained by skills 
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APPENDIX A1: Selections  
 
  N
155156
excluding non-respondents 151692
selecting men 71988
selecting employed 43263
selecting fulltimers 35635
excluding students, interns, military personnel 32819
reweighting Canada 27974
listwise deleting missings 26322
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APPENDIX A2: Country-level analyses 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  
  b p b p 
Austria Intercept 5,697 ,000 5,455 ,000 
 Required education ,084 ,000 ,072 ,000 
 Overeducation ,047 ,000 ,040 ,000 
 Undereducation -,007 ,398 -,005 ,582 
 Age ,019 ,049 ,016 ,095 
 Age^2 ,000 ,282 -9,085E-05 ,425 
 Work experience ,016 ,004 ,017 ,003 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,003 ,000 ,005 
 Number of working hours ,014 ,000 ,014 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,140 ,000 -,077 ,006 
 1.5 generation migrants -,016 ,884 -,007 ,950 
 2nd generation migrants -,013 ,827 ,011 ,843 
 2.5 generation migrants ,003 ,939 ,015 ,687 
 Remigrants ,153 ,491 ,164 ,451 
 Numeracy  ,151 ,000 
Belgium Intercept 6,464 ,000 6,386 ,000 
 Required education ,066 ,000 ,055 ,000 
 Overeducation ,045 ,000 ,037 ,000 
 Undereducation -,013 ,040 -,009 ,151 
 Age -,002 ,824 -,007 ,494 
 Age^2 ,000 ,202 ,000 ,086 
 Work experience ,019 ,001 ,020 ,000 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 Number of working hours ,012 ,000 ,012 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,012 ,744 ,031 ,394 
 1.5 generation migrants ,024 ,846 ,042 ,726 
 2nd generation migrants ,044 ,522 ,065 ,337 
 2.5 generation migrants ,006 ,870 ,007 ,854 
 Remigrants ,007 ,935 ,009 ,909 
 Numeracy  ,104 ,000 
Canada Intercept 5,535 ,000 5,317 ,000 
 Required education ,085 ,000 ,067 ,000 
 Overeducation ,053 ,000 ,039 ,000 
 Undereducation -,028 ,002 -,020 ,025 
 Age ,030 ,003 ,032 ,002 
 Age^2 ,000 ,004 ,000 ,005 
 Work experience ,021 ,000 ,018 ,001 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,011 ,000 ,023 
 Number of working hours ,016 ,000 ,016 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,168 ,000 -,125 ,000 
 1.5 generation migrants ,090 ,606 ,060 ,726 
 2nd generation migrants -,003 ,963 ,003 ,958 
 2.5 generation migrants ,023 ,632 ,025 ,589 
 Remigrants -,191 ,144 -,181 ,159 
 Numeracy  ,151 ,000 
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APPENDIX A2: Country-level analyses (continued) 
  Model 1  Model 2  
  b p b p 
Cyprus Intercept 5,682 ,000 5,572 ,000 
 Required education ,071 ,000 ,068 ,000 
 Overeducation ,017 ,060 ,015 ,096 
 Undereducation -,033 ,000 -,030 ,001 
 Age ,033 ,019 ,033 ,018 
 Age^2 ,000 ,082 ,000 ,074 
 Work experience ,023 ,001 ,022 ,001 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,004 ,000 ,006 
 Number of working hours ,005 ,001 ,005 ,001 
 1st generation migrants -,074 ,109 -,067 ,151 
 1.5 generation migrants -,060 ,460 -,062 ,446 
 2nd generation migrants ,070 ,712 ,047 ,806 
 2.5 generation migrants -,066 ,476 -,065 ,481 
 Remigrants ,111 ,117 ,107 ,129 
 Numeracy  ,053 ,075 
Czech Republic Intercept 6,130 ,000 6,075 ,000 
 Required education ,078 ,000 ,073 ,000 
 Overeducation ,038 ,000 ,035 ,000 
 Undereducation -,019 ,105 -,016 ,159 
 Age -,005 ,698 -,007 ,577 
 Age^2 -9,642E-05 ,531 -6,862E-05 ,657 
 Work experience ,031 ,000 ,032 ,000 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,005 ,000 ,004 
 Number of working hours ,005 ,000 ,005 ,000 
 1st generation migrants ,048 ,471 ,060 ,363 
 1.5 generation migrants -,069 ,636 -,079 ,591 
 2nd generation migrants ,049 ,608 ,048 ,615 
 2.5 generation migrants -,025 ,540 -,023 ,578 
 Remigrants -,159 ,400 -,166 ,380 
 Numeracy  ,052 ,051 
Denmark Intercept 6,043 0,000 5,916 0,000 
 Required education ,068 ,000 ,060 ,000 
 Overeducation ,025 ,000 ,019 ,000 
 Undereducation -,004 ,500 ,000 ,961 
 Age ,032 ,000 ,032 ,000 
 Age^2 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 Work experience ,008 ,015 ,007 ,035 
 Work experience^2 -9,461E-05 ,095 -7,739E-05 ,169 
 Number of working hours ,015 ,000 ,015 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,107 ,000 -,070 ,000 
 1.5 generation migrants -,020 ,715 -,005 ,933 
 2nd generation migrants ,033 ,695 ,062 ,457 
 2.5 generation migrants ,036 ,335 ,037 ,312 
 Remigrants -,160 ,058 -,155 ,063 
 Numeracy  ,084 ,000 
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APPENDIX A2: Country-level analyses (continued) 
  Model 1  Model 2  
  b p b p 
Estonia Intercept 4,891 ,000 4,569 ,000 
 Required education ,072 ,000 ,055 ,000 
 Overeducation ,018 ,050 ,007 ,417 
 Undereducation -,005 ,664 ,002 ,882 
 Age ,055 ,001 ,051 ,001 
 Age^2 -,001 ,000 -,001 ,000 
 Work experience ,013 ,136 ,013 ,141 
 Work experience^2 -9,887E-06 ,957 -2,002E-05 ,912 
 Number of working hours ,020 ,000 ,021 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,036 ,462 -,012 ,804 
 1.5 generation migrants -,129 ,376 -,148 ,305 
 2nd generation migrants -,072 ,119 -,047 ,302 
 2.5 generation migrants -,085 ,033 -,060 ,130 
 Remigrants ,000 ,999 -,026 ,862 
 Numeracy  ,205 ,000 
Finland Intercept 6,086 ,000 5,911 ,000 
 Required education ,061 ,000 ,056 ,000 
 Overeducation ,034 ,000 ,028 ,000 
 Undereducation -,014 ,008 -,013 ,015 
 Age ,013 ,126 ,014 ,095 
 Age^2 ,000 ,150 ,000 ,122 
 Work experience ,023 ,000 ,022 ,000 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 Number of working hours ,017 ,000 ,017 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,179 ,000 -,137 ,003 
 1.5 generation migrants ,518 ,041 ,558 ,027 
 2nd generation migrants -,371 ,144 -,281 ,267 
 2.5 generation migrants -,002 ,971 ,014 ,827 
 Remigrants ,033 ,684 ,026 ,747 
 Numeracy  ,071 ,000 
Germany Intercept 5,182 ,000 4,858 ,000 
 Required education ,117 ,000 ,092 ,000 
 Overeducation ,047 ,000 ,028 ,001 
 Undereducation -,018 ,050 -,002 ,856 
 Age ,040 ,000 ,040 ,000 
 Age^2 -,001 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 Work experience ,011 ,051 ,009 ,108 
 Work experience^2 -7,668E-05 ,499 -3,457E-05 ,754 
 Number of working hours ,010 ,000 ,010 ,000 
 1st generation migrants ,034 ,304 ,074 ,020 
 1.5 generation migrants -,007 ,941 ,043 ,661 
 2nd generation migrants ,090 ,032 ,102 ,012 
 2.5 generation migrants -,024 ,433 -,027 ,360 
 Remigrants ,294 ,101 ,231 ,186 
 Numeracy  ,221 ,000 
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APPENDIX A2: Country-level analyses (continued) 
  Model 1  Model 2  
  b p b p 
Ireland Intercept 5,267 ,000 5,071 ,000 
 Required education ,085 ,000 ,069 ,000 
 Overeducation ,026 ,001 ,017 ,025 
 Undereducation -,044 ,000 -,030 ,001 
 Age ,038 ,009 ,034 ,018 
 Age^2 ,000 ,033 ,000 ,069 
 Work experience ,022 ,001 ,021 ,001 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,068 ,000 ,064 
 Number of working hours ,013 ,000 ,013 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,125 ,000 -,102 ,003 
 1.5 generation migrants -,061 ,446 -,065 ,400 
 2nd generation migrants ,081 ,630 ,068 ,680 
 2.5 generation migrants -,003 ,968 -,017 ,796 
 Remigrants -,108 ,143 -,123 ,087 
 Numeracy  ,186 ,000 
Italy Intercept 5,518 ,000 5,314 ,000 
 Required education ,062 ,000 ,054 ,000 
 Overeducation ,019 ,007 ,013 ,070 
 Undereducation -,024 ,000 -,018 ,004 
 Age ,035 ,002 ,035 ,001 
 Age^2 ,000 ,001 ,000 ,002 
 Work experience ,020 ,000 ,017 ,001 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,244 ,000 ,407 
 Number of working hours ,014 ,000 ,014 ,000 
 1st generation migrants ,002 ,967 ,028 ,558 
 1.5 generation migrants -,128 ,267 -,134 ,241 
 2nd generation migrants ,178 ,442 ,231 ,313 
 2.5 generation migrants ,056 ,441 ,066 ,362 
 Remigrants ,008 ,928 ,014 ,879 
 Numeracy  ,105 ,000 
Japan Intercept 5,901 ,000 5,511 ,000 
 Required education ,090 ,000 ,071 ,000 
 Overeducation ,021 ,001 ,007 ,242 
 Undereducation -,032 ,002 -,016 ,122 
 Age ,015 ,220 ,013 ,279 
 Age^2 ,000 ,395 -9,408E-05 ,479 
 Work experience ,048 ,000 ,045 ,000 
 Work experience^2 -,001 ,000 -,001 ,000 
 Number of working hours ,003 ,005 ,003 ,001 
 1st generation migrants   
 1.5 generation migrants ,266 ,208 ,262 ,201 
 2nd generation migrants 
 2.5 generation migrants ,080 ,356 ,101 ,227 
 Remigrants -,088 ,808 -,121 ,731 
 Numeracy  ,226 ,000 
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APPENDIX A2: Country-level analyses (continued) 
  Model 1  Model 2  
  b p b p 
Korea Intercept 5,193 ,000 5,025 ,000 
 Required education ,087 ,000 ,078 ,000 
 Overeducation ,032 ,000 ,026 ,000 
 Undereducation -,051 ,000 -,043 ,000 
 Age ,069 ,000 ,067 ,000 
 Age^2 -,001 ,000 -,001 ,000 
 Work experience ,025 ,000 ,025 ,000 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,055 ,000 ,035 
 Number of working hours ,000 ,649 ,000 ,724 
 1st generation migrants -,193 ,025 -,118 ,178 
 1.5 generation migrants   
 2nd generation migrants 
 2.5 generation migrants ,026 ,812 ,024 ,828 
 Remigrants ,064 ,640 ,092 ,501 
 Numeracy  ,114 ,000 
Netherlands Intercept 4,838 ,000 4,725 ,000 
 Required education ,097 ,000 ,085 ,000 
 Overeducation ,034 ,000 ,025 ,002 
 Undereducation -,023 ,000 -,017 ,003 
 Age ,062 ,000 ,059 ,000 
 Age^2 -,001 ,000 -,001 ,000 
 Work experience -,003 ,509 -,003 ,524 
 Work experience^2 5,131E-05 ,619 5,664E-05 ,579 
 Number of working hours ,013 ,000 ,013 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,159 ,000 -,112 ,002 
 1.5 generation migrants -,040 ,624 -,020 ,807 
 2nd generation migrants -,029 ,761 -,009 ,925 
 2.5 generation migrants ,104 ,009 ,107 ,006 
 Remigrants ,136 ,284 ,170 ,176 
 Numeracy  ,112 ,000 
Norway Intercept 6,159 ,000 6,018 ,000 
 Required education ,067 ,000 ,056 ,000 
 Overeducation ,040 ,000 ,031 ,000 
 Undereducation -,027 ,000 -,021 ,001 
 Age ,025 ,000 ,023 ,001 
 Age^2 ,000 ,001 ,000 ,002 
 Work experience ,012 ,003 ,010 ,008 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,021 ,000 ,044 
 Number of working hours ,015 ,000 ,015 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,156 ,000 -,095 ,000 
 1.5 generation migrants -,039 ,609 -,026 ,734 
 2nd generation migrants -,068 ,421 -,033 ,695 
 2.5 generation migrants ,035 ,306 ,041 ,229 
 Remigrants -,092 ,181 -,089 ,191 
 Numeracy  ,109 ,000 
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  Model 1  Model 2  
  b p b p 
Poland Intercept 5,526 ,000 5,235 ,000 
 Required education ,073 ,000 ,059 ,000 
 Overeducation ,033 ,000 ,022 ,001 
 Undereducation -,027 ,002 -,015 ,086 
 Age ,012 ,248 ,015 ,122 
 Age^2 ,000 ,070 ,000 ,037 
 Work experience ,026 ,000 ,024 ,000 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,004 ,000 ,005 
 Number of working hours ,011 ,000 ,011 ,000 
 1st generation migrants 
 1.5 generation migrants ,206 ,451 ,233 ,387 
 2nd generation migrants ,181 ,164 ,173 ,178 
 2.5 generation migrants ,056 ,379 ,042 ,499 
 Remigrants ,140 ,608 ,162 ,549 
 Numeracy  ,149 ,000 
Slovak Republic Intercept 5,408 ,000 5,277 ,000 
 Required education ,099 ,000 ,094 ,000 
 Overeducation ,067 ,000 ,063 ,000 
 Undereducation ,002 ,932 ,003 ,897 
 Age ,006 ,769 ,007 ,727 
 Age^2 ,000 ,394 ,000 ,388 
 Work experience ,020 ,071 ,019 ,092 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,283 ,000 ,309 
 Number of working hours ,011 ,000 ,011 ,000 
 1st generation migrants ,076 ,782 ,086 ,753 
 1.5 generation migrants ,129 ,480 ,132 ,470 
 2nd generation migrants -,069 ,692 -,069 ,693 
 2.5 generation migrants ,079 ,272 ,077 ,286 
 Remigrants -,047 ,787 -,041 ,811 
 Numeracy  ,061 ,146 
Spain Intercept 5,995 ,000 5,862 ,000 
 Required education ,068 ,000 ,062 ,000 
 Overeducation ,021 ,000 ,016 ,006 
 Undereducation -,033 ,000 -,030 ,000 
 Age ,036 ,001 ,035 ,001 
 Age^2 ,000 ,001 ,000 ,002 
 Work experience ,009 ,081 ,009 ,095 
 Work experience^2 -5,522E-05 ,611 -4,013E-05 ,711 
 Number of working hours ,003 ,040 ,004 ,025 
 1st generation migrants -,145 ,000 -,119 ,002 
 1.5 generation migrants -,068 ,380 -,042 ,589 
 2nd generation migrants -,286 ,137 -,290 ,130 
 2.5 generation migrants ,006 ,939 ,022 ,796 
 Remigrants ,002 ,985 ,014 ,897 
 Numeracy  ,082 ,001 
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  Model 1  Model 2  
  b p b p 
Sweden Intercept 6,539 ,000 6,349 ,000 
 Required education ,067 ,000 ,057 ,000 
 Overeducation ,027 ,000 ,018 ,012 
 Undereducation -,013 ,030 -,008 ,164 
 Age -,006 ,443 -,005 ,553 
 Age^2 ,000 ,262 9,151E-05 ,326 
 Work experience ,020 ,000 ,020 ,000 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 Number of working hours ,014 ,000 ,014 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,059 ,011 -,011 ,640 
 1.5 generation migrants -,041 ,721 -,026 ,819 
 2nd generation migrants ,022 ,652 ,033 ,506 
 2.5 generation migrants ,022 ,457 ,020 ,492 
 Remigrants -,084 ,427 -,032 ,763 
 Numeracy  ,095 ,000 
United Kingdom Intercept 4,687 ,000 4,276 ,000 
 Required education ,118 ,000 ,094 ,000 
 Overeducation ,034 ,000 ,018 ,015 
 Undereducation -,027 ,006 -,015 ,101 
 Age ,044 ,001 ,049 ,000 
 Age^2 ,000 ,004 -,001 ,001 
 Work experience ,012 ,084 ,009 ,190 
 Work experience^2 ,000 ,140 ,000 ,376 
 Number of working hours ,018 ,000 ,017 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,083 ,019 -,018 ,610 
 1.5 generation migrants -,021 ,850 -,031 ,772 
 2nd generation migrants ,021 ,717 ,076 ,173 
 2.5 generation migrants ,025 ,542 ,050 ,200 
 Remigrants -,078 ,434 -,086 ,367 
 Numeracy  ,237 ,000 
United States Intercept 4,845 ,000 4,701 ,000 
 Required education ,117 ,000 ,090 ,000 
 Overeducation ,036 ,001 ,014 ,186 
 Undereducation -,066 ,000 -,047 ,001 
 Age ,053 ,000 ,051 ,000 
 Age^2 -,001 ,002 ,000 ,004 
 Work experience ,004 ,609 ,003 ,737 
 Work experience^2 -6,820E-05 ,651 -6,669E-05 ,651 
 Number of working hours ,013 ,000 ,012 ,000 
 1st generation migrants -,068 ,157 -,013 ,790 
 1.5 generation migrants ,151 ,398 ,153 ,380 
 2nd generation migrants -,067 ,417 -,052 ,519 
 2.5 generation migrants -,013 ,859 -,012 ,867 
 Remigrants -,101 ,542 -,103 ,523 
 Numeracy  ,211 ,000 
Source: PIAAC 
 
